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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction for burglary 
rendered in the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, 
in and for Washington County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
J. Harlan Burns, Judge, presiding. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
Appellants were charged with the crime of burglary 
and were bound over for trial in the district court. A jury 
found them guilty and sentenced appellants to an indeterminate 
term as prescribed by law. It is from that conviction that 
this appeal arises. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks that the verdict of the lower court 
be sustained. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the 8th day of March, 1974, a complaint was filed 
against Clark Hastings and Leo James Suit, charging them with 
committing the crime of burglary, a third degree felony in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1953), as amended. 
A preliminary hearing was held on April 18, 1974, and appellants 
were bound over for trial in the district court. An informa-
tion was properly filed and the case went to trial on May 22, 
1974, before the Honorable J. Harlan Burns, sitting with a jury. 
Upon the following facts, the jury returned a verdict of guilty: 
On January 17, 1974, at approximately 1:00 o'clock 
a.m., Clark Hastings, Leo James Suit and Daniel Wilbur broke 
into a local hardwood and furniture store and removed several 
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items of inventory. Entry was accomplished by breaking out 
the glass window in the back door of the building. Appellants 
carried the stolen articles from the premises, placed them in 
their vehicle and fled the scene. All of the actions of 
appellants were part of a pre-conceived scheme to "hit" the 
store. The stolen properly was then transported to Las Vegas,, 
Nevada, where it was subsequently discovered pursuant to a valid 
search warrant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JURISDICTION OF THE DISTRICT COURT WAS PROPERLY 
INVOKED AS TO THE THIRD DEGREE FELONY BURGLARY CHARGE. 
Appellants contend the District Court proceeded without 
jurisdiction in the instant case. They claim that the complaint 
and the information charging them with the crime of burglary 
were fatally defective in that they failed to allege "intent," 
a requisite to criminal conduct, Utah Code Ann. 76-2-101 (1953), 
as amended. It is a correct statement of the law that all 
essential elements of the crime being charged must be alleged 
in the complaint and information. The crime of burglary, 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1953), as amended, is defined: 
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"A person is guilty of burglary 
• • if he enters or remains unlawfully in 
a building or any portion of a building 
with intent to commit a felony or theft 
or commit an assault of any person." 
The requisite elements are (1) unlawfully entering or remaining; 
(2) in a building; (3) with intent to (a) commit a felony, (b) 
commit a theft, or (c) commit an assault. 
The complaint reads as follows: 
"Clark Hastings, Leo James Suit and 
Daniel Wilbur on or about the 17th day of 
January A.D. 1974, at Hurricane, Utah, 
Washington County, State of Utah, did 
commit a 3rd degree felony as follows, 
to wit: Burglary, committed as follows: 
that they did then and there enter or 
remain unlawfully in the Graff Mercantile 
building with intent to commit theft in 
violation of 76-6-202 UCA 1953 as amended." 
The information reads similarly: 
"Burglary committed as follows: 
That said Willard Clark Hastings and Leo 
James Suit on or about the 17th day of 
Jan,., 1974 at Hurricane, Wash. County, State 
of Utah, did enter or remain unlawfully 
in the Graff Furniture and Hardware Building 
with intent to commit theft in violation of 
Section 76-6-202 UCA 1953, as amended." 
It is apparent that both the complaint and the 
information specifically allege "intent to commit theft" as an 
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element of the crime. There is no fatal defect as appellants 
contend. There is no defect at all. The jurisdiction of the 
district court to hear the third degree felony charge was 
therefore properly invoked according to the procedures provided 
by law. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CORROBORATE THE 
TESTIMONY OF AN ACCOMPLICE TO THE CRIME. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-18 (1953), as amended, reads: 
"A conviction shall not be had on 
the testimony of an accomplice, unless 
he is corroborated by other evidence, 
which in itself and without the aid of 
the testimony of the accomplice tends 
to connect the defendant with the 
commission of the offense; and the 
corroboration shall not be sufficient, 
if it merely shows the commission of the 
offense or the circumstances thereof." 
Appellants allege that the testimony of their 
accomplice, Daniel Wilbur, who was granted immunity in exchange 
for his testimony, was uncorroborated by other evidence and that 
their conviction cannot therefore stand. Were there in 
actuality no other evidence, Utah law would dictate a reversal. 
However, such is not the case. Sufficient corroborating 
evidence was presented to the court aside from the testimony 
of appellants' partner in crime. In State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 
365# 120 P.2d 285 at 299 (1941), Mr. Justice Wade stated: 
"This court has held that 
corroboration need not go to all 
the material facts testified to by 
the accomplice; that the corrobortive 
evidence need not be sufficient in 
itself to support a conviction; it 
may be slight and entitled to little 
consideration . . . the corroborating 
evidence must implicate the defendant 
in the offense and be inconsistent 
with his innocence, and must do more 
than cast a grave suspicion on him, 
and all this must be without the aid 
of testimony of the accomplice." 
See also State v. Simpson, 120 Utah 596, 236 P.2d 1077 (1951) ; 
State v. Stewart, 57 Utah 224, 193 Pac. 855 (1920); People v. 
Lee, 2 Utah 441 (1889); State v. Spencer, 15 Utah 149, 49 Pac. 
302 (1897); and State v. Brunner, 106 Utah 49, 145 P.2d 302 
(1944) . 
The evidence must be viewed independently of Daniel 
Wilbur's testimony. It must connect appellants to the commission 
of the offense, but need not be sufficient to support a convic-
tion. A look at the evidence offered at trial clearly shows 
that Mr. Wilbur's testimony did not alone convict appellants. 
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(1) Several guns were confiscated, pursuant to a search 
warrant, from the Las Vegas home of Roy Suit, brother of 
James Leo Suit, appellant (T.226-228). (2) The make, 
caliber and serial numbers of these firearms were identical 
to those stolen from Graffs on January 17, 1974 (T.95-109, 
226-228). This evidence goes to corroborate Mr. Wilbur's 
account and to connect defendants with the offense. (3) 
Testimony was given by a Mr. Foster to the effect that in 
the early morning of January 17, 1974, between 12:00 o'clock 
midnight and 2:00 o'clock a.m., Clark Hastings and Leo Suit 
appeared at his home. Hastings asked for lodging and for 
money (T.197). (4) Suit gave Mr. Foster a Brown 243 rifle 
which Hastings described as "hot" (T.198,202). (5) Suit 
then left Foster's residence (T.202) . (6) Foster later 
returned the rifle to Suit, and that same rifle was found by 
the police wrapped in green plastic and buried in the desert 
outside Hurricane (T.204). (7) Mrs. Isom, Leo Suit's 
mother-in-law, testified that her son-in-law received a 
telephone call on March 6, 1974, from his brother in Las Vegas 
(T.240), the same day the search warrant was executed and the 
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guns confiscated from the brother's home. (8) Suit borrowed 
Mrs. Isom's car and he and Clark Hastings carried from the 
house an object, described as a rifle, wrapped in green plastic. 
They also had with them a shovel (T.242-243). (9) Clayton 
Stratton testified that he saw one of the appellants parked 
in a car on a back road outside of Hurricane on the 6th day of 
March, 1974. He later led the police to that spot (T.257-258). 
(10) The police testified they followed tracks from the road 
to a cedar tree and dug up a green plastic bag containing a 
Brown 243 (T.265-266). There is ample evidence, provided in 
the record, on which to draw a connection between the appellants 
and the crime. This evidence need not support a conviction, 
nor go to support all the material facts testified to by the 
accomplice. It need only establish a connection between 
appellants and the crime and be inconsistent with their 
innocence to be considered corroborative. The jury was 
properly instructed on testimony of an accomplice and the need 
for corroborating evidence in Instructions Nos. 14 and 18. The 
requirements of Utah Code Ann. • § 77-31-18 (1953), as amended, 
were therefore met. 
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POINT III 
NO REVERSIBLE ERROR WAS COMMITTED BY THE TRIAL COURT 
IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY OR ADMITTING EVIDENCE. 
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in 
admitting evidence relating to "theft" and "stolen property" 
and in instructing the jury regarding that evidence. The 
evidence admitted consisted of the rifles confiscated from 
the Las Vegas home of appellant Suit's brother, and the Brown 
243 unearthed by the Hurricane police. These articles were 
admitted in order to establish a connection between appellants 
and the commission of the crime of burglary, not to establish 
guilt of "theft" or "possession of stolen property" or any 
other crime. The jury was properly instructed on these matters 
by the court in jury instruction No. 16. The evidence was 
offered to corroborate the testimony of Mr. Wilbur as required 
by Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-18 (1953), as amended. This evidence 
was a product of a valid search and seizure, pursuant to a 
warrant and was relevant and material. It was not error to 
admit it. . 
Appellants also claim that the Court erred in giving 
instruction No. 17, which reads: 
"You are instructed that 
possession of property recently 
stolen when no satisfactory 
explanation of such possession is 
made, shall be deemed prima facie 
evidence that the person in posses-
sion stole the property." 
This instruction is taken from Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-402 (1953), as amended. In State v. Kirkman, 20 Utah 
44, 432 P.2d 638 (1967), speaking of an almost identical 
statute repealed and reenacted in 1973, the Court said: 
"This statute has nothing to do 
with burglary and applies only to 
charges of stealing. However, one 
who has possession of recently stolen 
property would be faced with the 
situation of having adverse inferences 
drawn against him, and such inferences 
together with all the other evidence 
might be enough to convince a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant was guilty of larceny even 
in the absence of the statute above 
quoted. 
" (3) The same adverse inference 
will confront a defendant in a burglary 
case where he has possession of recently 
stolen property which could have been 
obtained only by a burglarious entry 
into a building. There would be a duty 
upon the one in possession of such 
property to explain his possession if he 
is to remove that adverse inference 
against him pointing toward his guilt; 
and if he gives a false account of how 
he acquired that possession, or having 
a reasonable opportunity to show that 
- i n -
his possession was honestly acquired 
he refuses or fails to do so, such 
conduct is a circumstance which may 
be considered by the jury along with 
all other evidence bearing upon the 
case in determining guilt or innocence. 
"This court has heretofore had 
occasion to deal with this problem. 
In the case of State v. Thomas, 121 
Utah 639, 244 P.2d 653, it was said: 
'We recognize the correctness 
of the defendant's assertion that 
mere possession of recently stolen 
property, if not coupled with other 
inculpatory or incriminating circum-
stances, would not justify submission 
of the case to the jury and would 
not be sufficient to support a convic-
tion. State v. Kinsey, 77 Utah 348, 295 
P. 247, and cases therein cited; State 
v. Nichols, 106 Utah 104, 145 P.2d 802. 
Conversely, however, possession of 
articles recently stolen, when coupled 
with circumstances inconsistent with 
innocence, such as hiding or concealing 
them, or of making a false or improbable 
or unsatisfactory explanation of the 
possession, may be sufficient to connect 
the possessor with the offense of burglary 
and justify his conviction of it.'" 
Although the instruction given was not properly 
applicable to the crime of burglary, not every error on the 
part of the court is grounds for reversal. According to Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-53-2 (1953), as amended, an error is reversible 
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only if the defendant is actually prejudiced by the error 
in respect to a substantial right. It is clear that the 
Court in Kirkman viewed possession of stolen property, 
taken from a burglarized building, to raise a strong 
inference of guilt, if not adequately explained. This 
inference, coupled with all the other evidence offered 
at trial, could certainly support a conviction, without 
Instruction No. 16. The conviction should not therefore 
be reversed. The effect of that instruction has not been 
shown to have substantially prejudiced appellants. 
Appellants admit in their complaint that no 
specific exception was made to the challenged instruction 
until motion for a new trial. General exceptions are 
insufficient to raise questions on appeal. State v. King, 
24 Utah 482, 68 Pac. 418 (1902). Appellants must specifically 
except to jury instructions, Utah Code Ann. § 77-37-2 (1953), 
as amended, in order for the lower court to first rule. 
As no such exceptions were taken they cannot now be raised. 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully seeks affirmance of the 
conviction in the lower court on the grounds that (1) the 
complaint and information complied in every respect with 
the requirements of the law and the jurisdiction of the 
district court was properly invoked; (2) there was 
sufficient evidence before the court to corroborate the 
testimony of the accomplice; and (3) no prejudicial error 
was committed by the trial court warranting reversal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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